An often cited advantage of group over individual decision making is the variety of perspectives, information, and knowledge that the individual members can bring to bear on a problem (e.g., Hoffman, 1965; Robbins, 1992) . For groups to realize this benefit, however, the individual members must contribute their resources, and their groups must process these resources appropriately. Steiner's (1972) classic formulation of the concept group process losses refers to those aspects of group interaction that hinder the effective exchange and use of individual member resources.
One source of loss is premature movement to consensus (Hackman & Kaplan, 1974; Hackman & Morris, 1975) , with dissenting opinions either being suppressed or dismissed (e.g., Janis, 1982) . Research evidence has shown that exposing a group that is in consensus to a dissenting opinion can lead the group to more effective decisions (e.g., Nemeth, 1986; Schwenk, 1990) . At the same time, there is also research showing that people who hold dissenting opinions are typically not likely to challenge the majority consensus by expressing those opinions (e.g., sion of minority opinions but reducing the influence of those opinions.
Influence of Minority Opinion Holders
Although there is still lingering controversy over the processes involved in mediating minority influence (cf. Baron, Kerr, & Miller, 1992; Brown, 1984; Turner, 1991 ) , most writers acknowledge that social influence in groups flows in both directions between majorities and minorities (Latan6 & Wolf, 1981; Moscovici, 1980 Moscovici, , 1985 "lhrner, 1991 ) . For example, according to Moscovici's dual-process model (Moscovici, 1980) , majority influence induces public compliance with group decisions, whereas minority influence induces private internalization of the minority position (Maass & Clark, 1984; Moscovici, 1980 Moscovici, , 1985 Moscovici & Faucheaux, 1972; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974; Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994) . Latan6 and Wolf ( 1981 ) , while preferring a single-process view, argue that majorities can affect minorities (and vice versa) as a function of variables such as the immediacy, power, and number of influencing agents (as specified by their social impact theory).
The public conformity of minorities to the majority position is thought to stem from normative sources of social influence such as the desire to gain social approval and to avoid disapproval, whereas minority influence on the majority's private opinions is linked to informational bases of influence (Moscovici, 1980 (Moscovici, , 1985 Mugny, 1982) . Presumably, majority members closely scrutinize the content of the minority arguments, making comparisons to reality. This cognitive activity is thought to open the way for private conversion, although normative processes continue to inhibit public endorsement of the minority opinion. Nemeth's (1985 Nemeth's ( , 1986 work, which also addresses cognitive processes, takes a slightly different direction by focusing on the influence of minority opinion on group decision quality. She has found that exposure to minority opinions can stimulate divergent thinking and widen the scope of groups' search for solutions. Even if the minority opinion does not prevail, the effect of its presence is increased likelihood that groups will find correct or novel solutions.
Expression of Minority Opinions
For minorities to stimulate the thinking of the other group members, the minorities have to share their opinions. There is wide recognition that expressing minority opinions is socially risky (Baron et al., 1992; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974; Myers, 1993; Wood et al., 1994) . Moscovici ( 1980 Moscovici ( , 1985 and Mugny (1982) , for example, argue that a minority who disagrees with an emerging group consensus creates conflict. Thus, people who express deviant opinions risk social disapproval (Schachter, 1951 ) . The chances that an individual will be willing to express a dissenting opinion will .increase, however, if the individual perceives the benefits to outweigh the costs. Factors that might encourage people to express minority opinions would include having personal qualities that can offset the risk (Hollander, 1958) ; getting support for their position (Latan6 & Wolf, 1981; Tanford & Penrod, 1984) ; and having a positive and accepting social atmosphere in the group (Hackman, 1987) . In fact, creating a nonjudgmental atmosphere is the cornerstone of group discussion techniques designed to maximize participant contributions (e.g., Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975; Osborn, 1957) . It has been argued that a potential benefit of GDSS technology is its creation of this type of low-risk environment for the contribution of dissenting minority opinions.
GrouP Decision Support Systems
GDSS technology combines tools for electronic communication, decision structuring, and record-keeping (DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987) . The prototypical system (e.g., Dennis et al., 1988; Watson, DeSanctis, & Poole, 1988; Zigurs, Poole, & DeSanctis, 1988 ) is housed in a "decision room," consisting of individual computer workstations, public display devices, and networking software that links the workstations together. One of the most named benefits of GDSS is that they reduce barriers to participation in group discussion (Dennis et al., 1988; DeSanctis & Gallupe, 1987; McLeod, 1992 McLeod, , 1996 . By providing each group member with a separate input device and equal access to the group's files, GDSS reduce the logistic barriers to participation, such as having to take turns in speaking and listening. These systems can also reduce social barriers to participation because most of them rely on anonymity as the default communication mode (Valacich, Jessup, Denrtis, & Nunamaker, 1992; Wagner, Wynne, & Mennecke, 1993) . Anonymity can reduce inhibition associated with evaluation apprehension and social status differences (Valacich et al., 1992) . On the other hand, anonymity has also been shown to increase conflict and negatively toned communication (Connolly, Jessup, & Valacich, 1990; Jessup, Connolly, & Galegher, 1990) . Rao and Jarvenpaa (1991) argued that these features specifically, the reduction of logistic barriers to participation through parallel access and the reduction of social barriers to participation through anonymity, would increase the likelihood of people who hold minority opinions expressing those opinions during GDSS-mediated discussion. As we have already suggested here, minorities may well experience high evaluation apprehension under face-to-face communication due to high social risk. Rao and Jarvenpaa theorized that anonymous GDSS would remove these sources of minorities' reluctance to contribute their opinions. On the basis of Nemeth's ( 1985 Nemeth's ( , 1986 research on minority opinions and decision quality, Rao and Jarvenpaa then concluded that the increased presence of minority opinions in GDSS discussion would result in increased decision quality.
Development of Study Hypotheses
We challenge Rao and Jarvenpaa's ( 1991 ) straightforward conclusion here. Although we agree with their analysis with respect to the effect of GDSS on the expression of minority opinions, we disagree with their conclusion with respect to the influence of those opinions. Instead, we argue that the same features that facilitate the contribution of minority opinions also reduce the impact of those opinions. That is, the minority's willingness to undertake the social risk of being identified as an opinion deviant is part of what gets the majority's attention (and perhaps respect) in the first place (Baron et al., 1992; Wood et al., 1994; Mugny, 1982; Moscovici, 1980 Moscovici, , 1985 . According to this "pain-gain" view, minority group members indicate their degree of commitment and the sincerity of their beliefs by their public willingness to contest majority views in settings where such behavior is likely to result in social censure. This would seem to be particularly true in cases of face-to-face interaction, where it would be hard for an opinion deviate to avoid the majority' s nonverbal expressions of ridicule and disapproval. In short, reducing this risk by using anonymous communication should also reduce a key reason for majorities to pay special attention to minority arguments. FaLrther, minorities must display consistency and a confident behavioral style to have influence (Maass & Clark, 1984; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974; Wood et al., 1994) . Because anonymous GDSS-mediated communication reduces nonverbal cues, the ability to observe behavioral style is greatly reduced, especially within the time limits of the typical lab study (Walther, 1993) . We would expect this also to contribute toa reduction of minority influence in GDSS-mediated communication.
This pain-gain hypothesis thus asserts that expression and influence of minority opinions both are correlated with social presence (Short, Williams, & Christie, 1976) , but in opposite directions. Social presence refers to the degree of tangibility and proximity of other people that one perceives in a communication situation. The higher the social presence of others, the more one is likely to pay attention to them, and the more one is likely to be influenced by them (Short et al., 1976) . We therefore argue that the expression of deviant minority opinions should be greatest when social presence is lowest because that is when the negative reactions of others are least likely to be felt. At the same time, once minority opinions are expressed, their influence will be greatest when social presence is highest because people pay more attention to each other under this condition.
It can be reasonably argued that GDSS communication is lower in social presence than face-to-face communication and that anonymous GDSS communication is lower in social presence than identified GDSS communication (Siegel, Dubrovsky, Kiesler & McGuire, 1986; Spears & Lea, 1994; Walther, 1993) . Hence, our pain-gain hypothesis would predict that the expression of minority opinions will be highest under anonymous GDSS and lowest in face-to-face communication, whereas the influence of those opinions will be highest in face-to-face communication and lowest in anonymous GDSS.
The scant research on minority influence in GDSSmediated communication provides equivocal support for our reasoning. Melone et al. (1993) examined minority influence in GDSS and face-to-face groups discussing an ethical dilemma problem. These researchers assigned a role to each member of six-person groups, giving the majority members roles of corporate self-interest and a lone minority a role of social responsibility. Their main finding was that after discussion, there was stronger movement toward social responsibility among GDSS than face-toface groups. This was true for individual choices among majorities and minorities and for group decisions. Thus, minorities appeared to be more influential in GDSS than in face-to-face discussion.
At first glance, these results appear inconsistent with our pain-gain hypothesis. But whether Melone et al.'s (1993) data are consistent with our reasoning becomes less clear when we closely examine some specific methodological features of their experiment. First, group members had been assigned roles by the experimenter across all experimental conditions. Therefore, risk to the minorities, in the face-to-face condition particularly, might have been small because their deviance could be attributed to external demands rather than to the minorities themselves. Second, Melone et al. did not instruct the groups to reach consensus decisions. Rather, group members provided individual private decisions after the group discussion, and the tabulation of these votes was taken as the group decision. Hence, the minorities were not in the position of having to persuade the majority to adopt the minority view. The converse was also true of the majority. Minority dissent therefore did not impede groups from completing the task, and thus they may have avoided some of the social conflict described by Moscovici (1980 Moscovici ( , 1985 and Mugny (1982) . Finally, Melone et al. structured the GDSS discussions by designating specific periods for group members to study each other's comments, separate from periods of discussion. This structuring increased the likelihood that the minority views would not be ignored.
One result of these experimental procedures, we be-lieve, is the reduction of the potential social risk for minorities across all of their experimental conditions. Thus, although anonymity may have reduced social risk for minorities, the minorities in the face-to-face condition may have also faced lower social risk due to this experimental paradigm. Therefore, the Melone et al. (1993) findings are inconclusive with respect to the relative impact of GDSS on minority opinion expression versus influence. In another study, Dennis (in press) created minority opinion holders through differential distribution of information, using a paradigm similar to the one used in the current study. His experimental task required the group members to choose the best candidate from a set of applicants, a decision that could be made correctly only if they pooled their different information together. Dennis found that GDSS groups discussed more of the information necessary to find the correct answer than did face-to-face groups but were not more likely to choose the correct answer for the final group decision. Further, members of the GDSS groups remembered less of the information they discussed than did the members of face-to-face groups. Although Dennis's results are more in accord with the pain-gain view, he did not report data on the specific behavior of the minority opinion holders. There is as of yet no research that directly examines whether GDSS differentially affects the expression and influence of minority opinion.
Further, the role of anonymity in the minority influence literature more broadly has received almost no research attention. The Melone et al. (1993) study compared anonymous and identified GDSS conditions and found no systematic differences. A meta-analysis by Wood et al. (1994) showed that physically absent minorities were more influential than face-to-face minorities, a finding that appears contradictory to the reasoning we are presenting here. Wood et al., however, did not report whether physically absent minorities were also anonymous. Moreover, a methodological confound, characteristic of the studies examined by Wood et al., makes it difficult to interpret their finding in terms of our social presence reasoning. Specifically, they compared studies in which the minority opinion was delivered in written form by absent sources with studies in which the minority opinion was delivered in face-to-face discussion, usually by experimental confederates. It is thus unclear whether the differences in the effects of minority opinion holders found between these two types of studies were due to the physical presence or absence of minority source or to the difference in method of opinion delivery. The Wood et al. analysis therefore is inconclusive with respect to the role of anonymity in minority influence.
The current study tests directly the differential effects of computer-supported communication and anonymity on the expression versus the influence of minority opinions in small-group decision-making discussion. We base our predictions on what we have labeled a pain-gain hypothesis, which assumes that minority opinion expression varies indirectly with social presence, whereas minority opinion influence varies directly with social presence. We report results from an experiment in which groups worked on decision problems in either face-to-face or in computer-linked (GDSS) groups. GDSS groups were further subdivided into anonymous and identified conditions. We reasoned that these three conditions could be arrayed along a continuum of increasing social presence from anonymous GDSS to identified GDSS to face-to-face communication. We test the following hypotheses:
Minority Opinion Expression
Hypothesis 1 : The number of minority opinion holder arguments mentioned and repeated during discussion will decrease as the social presence of the communication situation increases.
Attention to Minority Opinions
Hypothesis 2a: Positive reactions to minority opinion holder arguments by majority opinion holders will increase as the social presence of the communication situation increases.
Hypothesis 2b: Negative reactions to minority opinion holder arguments by majority opinion holders will decrease as the social presence of the communication situation increases.
Hypothesis 2c: Attempts to pool information will increase as the social presence of the communication situation increases.
Influence of Minority Opinions
Hypothesis 3: Majority group members will change their private opinions to be more similar to the minority opinion as social presence of the communication situation increases.
Hypothesis 4: Group decisions will be more similar to the minority opinion as social presence of the communication situation increases.
Method

Research Participants
The participants were 236 undergraduate and graduate students (126 men and 110 women) enrolled in large introductory classes in psychology and management, who received course credit for their participation. Individual participants were assigned randomly to 4-person groups, for a total of 59 groups. The groups were then assigned randomly to experimental conditions. Due to scheduling and facility constraints, it was not possible to assign an equal number of groups to each of the experimental conditions. In the final sample, there were 14 faceto-face groups, 20 anonymous GDSS groups, and 25 identified GDSS groups.
Manipulation of Independent Variable
Three experimental conditions were creaw_d: face-to-face discussion, identified GDSS discussion, and anonymous GDSS dis-cussion. The design of this experiment was not a full factorial because anonymity couM not be effectively manipulated in the face-to-face discussion condition. Thus, face-to-face groups were tested only under nonanonymous conditions, and these groups met in a small conference room containing a table and chairs.
In both the anonymous and identified GDSS-mediated conditions, the groups met in a lab, where they were seated in view of each other at individual computer workstations. The software used to support the group discussion was the VisionQuest TM group support system marketed by Collaboration Technologies Corporation in Austin, TX (Bostrom, Watson, & Van Over, 1992; Wagner et al., 1993) . The groups in the current study used a brain-writing tool, which splits each participant's monitor screen into windows for input and display. The entire set of comments entered remained visible at all times, and participants could easily move between scrolling through the comments and entering their own comments. Participants in the GDSS conditions were instructed to talk to each other only through the computer once the session began. In no groups did they attempt to exchange verbal comments during the discussion. A 10-min practice period with the software was sufficient, and no participants experienced difficulty in using the program. Transcripts, generated automatically by the software, were used in later analysis.
Anonymity was manipulated by the procedures used to seat the participants in the lab and by the experimental instruction script. Three to four groups were tested in the lab at the same time. The procedures used to manipulate anonymity required that all groups in a particular session be tested under the same experimental condition: either all anonymous or all identified. Preliminary analyses of variance (ANOVAs) of experimental session nested within GDSS condition were conducted for each of the dependent variables, followed by Scheff6 tests, to determine whether experimental session as a factor affected results within the anonymous and identified GDSS conditions. The largest omnibus F test was not significant (F = 0.99), and the Scheff6 tests showed no significant differences between any two sessions within conditions. We thus proceeded with our analyses, treating each group as an independent observation.
When participants in the identified conditions arrived for the experiment, they were introduced to the other members of their group and encouraged to get acquainted while the experimenter finished getting things set up. Group members were seated together in the lab at adjacent workstations, where name placards were placed on top of each participant's monitor. The participants in this condition were instructed that because their electronic communication would be anonymous by default, they would have to add their names to the beginning of each of their comments as they typed. The participants readily complied with this instruction, as it was necessary to give reminders in only a few groups.
In the anonymous condition, the participants were greeted individually by the experimenter, who checked their names off as they arrived. Each was escorted immediately to a computer workstation and told to await further instructions. The seating assignments were determined randomly, and the participants were seated physically far apart, thus making it nearly impossible to see the monitor screens of any other individual. Moreover, these groups were told explicitly that they would be communicaring anonymously with some of the people in the room and that the other members of their group were scattered in a random pattern. These participants were instructed that their electronic communication would be anonymous by default and that they should not include their names on any of their comments. It was not necessary to give any reminder of this instruction in any of these groups.
Task and Minority Influence
Because the interest in this study was to examine both the expression and the influence of minority opinions, it was necessary to ensure that someone in each group would hold a minority opinion. Moreover, we wanted to examine the impact .of exposure to minority opinions on group decision quality. Thus, we sought a task that could be objectively scored and would lend itself to information manipulation. The work of Garold Stasser and his colleagues (e.g., Stasser, 1988 Stasser, , 1992 Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Stewart & Stasser, 1996) on information sharing in group discussion provided the basis for developing the task used in the current study.
Using their "hidden-profile" paradigm, we developed a task for the current study involving a financial investment decision. In this task, participants were asked to take the role of the board of directors of the ACME Investments Company. Their task was to evaluate three companies available for acquisition using a specified set of investment criteria and to provide a rank ordering of the companies' desirability. Profiles on each of the three companies included financial opinions of in-house and external financial analysts, information on the company's business strategy, strength of it s management team, its market position, and its human resources practices. The investment criteria for evaluating the companies included long-term financial return, the degree of risk tolerated, the ability of the company to stand on its own, and fit with ACME's general business philosophy.
The minority opinion holder was created through the distribution of information about the three companies across the group members. The task was designed so that the full information showed Company A to be the best investment, Company C to be the next best, and Company B to be the least desirable of the three. Thus, the ideal rank ordering of the three companies was designed to be Company A > Company C > Company B. A hidden profile was created among three of the group members by giving them partial information so that they each received a preponderance of information favorable toward Company B and unfavorable toward Company A, and this set of information was shared across these 3 group members. At the same time, each of the majority group members received two unique pieces of information unfavorable to Company B and favorable to Company A. All 4 group members received the same full information set about Company C. The 4th group member received full information about all the companies as described above. Thus, it was expected that before discussion, 3 of the 4 group members would rank order the companies B > C > A and the 4th group member would favor the correct rank order, A > C > B. Following Stasser and Stewart (1992) and Stewart and Stasser (1996) , we did not explicitly inform the groups that their information sets were different in our experimental instructions. Extei~sive pretesting involving expert and naive judges validated the ideal rank ordering of the three companies and demonstrated that respondents could readily discover the correct answer with the full set of information. 1
Experimental Procedure
Once participants were seated either in the lab or conference room, paper copies of the task materials and task instructions were distributed to them individually. Within each group, the person to receive the minority information set was selected randomly at the time of assigning the groups to conditions. The remaining three sets of information were distributed in the order of group member seating. Once the information was distributed, the experimenter then read aloud the task instructions, which the participants followed along on their paper copies. The participants then read silently their copies of the company profiles and provided their private opinions of the correct rank ordering of the three companies on special forms provided. To reinforce the privacy of these decisions, participants were not asked to put their names on the forms. We coded the forms with innocuous symbols that corresponded with the different sets of information. After the individuals recorded their private opinions, groups were then instructed to discuss the three companies and to reach a unanimous decision on a rank order among them. Groups in the faceto-face conditions then moved immediately to the discussion. The experimenter remained in the room throughout the session, and audiotaped the discussions, which were transcribed for later analysis. Groups in the GDSS conditions received the brief software training and then moved to the discussion.
The groups were not given a definite time limit for their discussion at the outset but were told that most groups took approximately 30 min. If a decision had not been reached at the end of 35 rain, the experimenter gave the groups a 10-rain warning and stopped the discussion at the end of 45 rain, even if a decision had not been reached. Seven groups, six in the anonymous GDSS condition and one in the identified GDSS condition, failed to reach a decision within the 45-min period. At the end of the discussion, participants in the face-to-face conditions recorded the final group decision on a special form provided, and groups in the GDSS conditions typed the group decision into their computer transcripts. Participants in all conditions provided their current private opinions on special forms provided. The participants were then debriefed and asked not to discuss the experiment with their classmates. The solution to the task was made available after the data from all groups were collected. in their sets of information and attempted to pool their information together. The positive (e.g., agreement ) and negative (e.g., rejection or criticism) reactions to minority arguments from majority group members were counted, and the information-pooling variable was scored on a 5-point scale ranging from no mention of different information (0) Two doctoral students in management coded the transcripts for these measures. Following procedures described in Stasser and Stewart (1992) , Stasser, Taylor, and Hanna (1989) , and Stewart and Stasser (1996) , we obtained estimates of interrater reliability by correlating the two sets of counts and then using the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula for the final reliability. The reliability estimates were .94 for number of pieces of unique minority information, .96 for repetitions of minority information, .69 for positive reactions to minority arguments, .84 for negative reactions to minority arguments, and .94 for realizing and pooling different information. With the exception of positive reactions to minority arguments, these reliability estimates are well within acceptable range. FOr the final measures of these variables, we took the average between the two coders.
Finally, we computed two measures of minority opinion influence. These were change in majority members' private opinions after discussion and the quality of group decisions. The influence of minority arguments would be reflected in higher quality for both of these measures because the correct answer could be reached by the others only after they had heard and incorporated the information contributed by the fully informed minority. To measure decision quality, a six-level variable was created using the logic described earlier about the most correct rank order among the three companies. The two rank orders placing Company A first (A > C > B and A > B > C) were assigned values of 6 and 5, respectively. The two rank orders placing Company C first (C > A > B and C > B > A) were assigned values of 4 and 3, respectively. The two rank orders placing Company B first (B > A > C and B > C > A) were assigned values of 2 and 1, respectively. Change in private opinions was calculated by subtracting the value of the participants' prediscussion rank orders from the value of their postdiscussion rank orders. Thus, larger numbers represented an increase in individual decision quality after discussion. 2
Dependent Measures
The extent of minority opinion expression was operationalized by counting in the discussion transcripts the total number of their unshared pieces of information the minorities presented and the number of times they repeated those arguments. This first measure represents information coverage, and the second represents persistence.
A second set of variables assessed the attention that majority group members gave to the minority information during their decision-making process. These included positive and negative public reactions to the minority arguments (Alderton & Frey, 1983) and the extent to which groups discovered the differences A copy of the task materials is available from Poppy Lauretta McLeod, along with a full description of the validation procedures.
2 It is possible that results based on such a variable can be misleading. For example, a score of zero could be earned by both individuals who chose the correct answer before discussion and did not change that answer after discussion and individuals who chose and stuck with incorrect answers. A less misleading measure would be the postdiscussion decisions. This measure correlated .87 with the change variable. Moreover, the ANOVA results were exactly parallel between these two measures. We therefore chose to focus on the change measure because it more intuitively reflected the notion of being influenced.
Results
Manipulation Checks
To check our manipulation of anonymity, we asked the participants to complete a postexperimental questionnaire on which they indicated, using 3-point scales, the extent to which they could identify the authors of specific comments and their own comments could be identified by others. Research participants in the anonymous GDSS condition reported significantly lower ability to identify the source of specific comments, t(234) = 5.52, p < .001, and lower beliefs that their comments could be identified by other group members, t(234) = 4.00, p < .001, than did research participants in the average of the identified GDSS and face-to-face conditions.
To check that the experimental materials resulted in minorities who favored Company A, we examined the private prediscussion decisions. In 85% (i.e., 50 of 59) of the groups, the designated minority chose Company A as the best company, and the group members in the majority overwhelmingly chose Company B as the best choice (88%). The information distribution manipulation thus worked for the great majority of the groups but was not perfect.
Analysis Strategy
Only those 50 groups in which the designated minority chose Company A as the top choice were included in the remaining analyses, which resulted in 11 face-to-face groups, 22 identified GDSS groups; and 17 anonymous GDSS groups. Preliminary analyses showed that transcript length, operationalized as number of speaking turns, differed significantly among the conditions. Groups in the face-to-face condition produced significantly longer transcripts than did groups in the two GDSS conditions, t(49) = 4.08,p < .001. This is a common finding, which is largely due to the greater time required for typing than for speaking (Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984; McLeod, 1992) . To ensure that differences in our count variables would not be attributed to this effect, we controlled for transcript length in our analysis procedures. The variables for minority argument expressions and majority member reactions to the minority arguments were analyzed with an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) using experimental condition as the grouping factor and transcript length as the covariate. The remaining variables were analyzed with simple one-way ANOVAs using experimental condition as the grouping factor. Planned contrasts for linear trend were then computed to test our specific hypotheses (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985) . Table 1 contains the interrelations of all study variables, and Table 2 contains the means and standard deviations within conditions.
Expression of Minority Opinion
Experimental condition had significant effects on the number of pieces of unshared information the minorities presented, F(2, 46) = 6.89, p = .003, and the number of times they repeated the unshared information, F(2, 46) --7.03, p = .003. The planned contrast for linear trend was significant for number of minority arguments mentioned, t(46) = 2.52, p < .05, d = 1.12, and frequency of repetitions, t(46) = 2.15, p < .05, d = 1.12, but examination of the means in Table 2 shows that this trend was due to the large difference between the anonymous GDSS and the other groups. Post hoc Bonferroni tests showed that the identified GDSS and face-to-face conditions did not differ from each other on either of these two measures. Thus, minorities presented more of their arguments and repeated those arguments more frequently under anonymous GDSS discussion than in any other condition, partially consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Attention to Minority Opinion
We examined the reactions of the majority to the minority arguments and the extent to which the group tried to pool the members' different information. There were significant differences in positive reactions, F(2, 46) = 4.47, p = .02, and in negative reactions, F(2, 46) = 10.14, p < .001. The linear trend for positive reactions was significant, showing the highest number of reactions among the faceto-face groups, t(46) = 2.31, p < .05, d = 0.72. The means in Table 2 suggest that this difference is almost entirely due to the difference between face-to-face and the two GDSS conditions, and post hoc Bonferroni tests showed that the two latter conditions did not differ significantly from each other. For negative reactions, the linear trend also was significant, t(46) = 4.40, p < .001, d = 1.34, and the direction of the means was as predicted, with anonymous GDSS the highest and face-to-face the lowest. These results are partially consistent with Hypothesis 2a and completely consistent with Hypothesis 2b.
As noted earlier, the discussion transcripts were content analyzed for evidence of information pooling. Experimental condition had significant effects on this measure, F(2, 47) = 12.01, p < .001. The linear trend contrast was significant, t(47) = 4.32, p < .001, d = 1.26, but again this difference was due primarily to the difference between face-to-face and the two GDSS groups. The GDSS conditions did not differ from each other according to the Bonferroni test, partially consistent with Hypothesis 2c.
Influence of Minority Opinion
We examined the change in private opinions of majority opinion holders and the quality of the final group decision as measures of influence. Experimental condition had a significant effect on change in majority member private opinions, F(2, 47) = 18.37, p < .001. The contrast for linear trend was significant, t(47) = 5.16, p < .001, d = 1.50. The direction of the means showed that this effect was due primarily to the difference between the faceto-face and the two GDSS conditions together. Post hoc Bonferroni tests showed the GDSS conditions not to differ from each other significantly. These findings are partially consistent with Hypothesis 3. We next examined the quality of group decision. With respect to the seven groups that failed to reach decisigns within the time period, we reasoned that this outcome represented the lowest possible degree of minority opinion influence. Not reaching consensus could be considered an instance of failing to find the correct answer, similar to reaching consensus on an incorrect answer. Further justification for this strategy came from a careful examination of the data from these groups. We found that none of these groups scored above 1.5 on the informationpooling measure and that the private decisions of the majority members clid not change in the direction of the minority opinion, even as the minority opinion holders persisted with their arguments to the end of the session. We thus assigned a decision quality score of 0 to those groups that did not reach a consensus decision and included them with the other groups in the ANOVA. The main effect for experimental condition was significant, F(2, 47) = 18.80, p < .001. The linear trend contrast also was significant, with groups in the face-to-face conditions making the highest quality decisions, t(47) = 5.33, p < .001, d = 1.55. Again, the pattern of the means showed that the effect was due mainly to the difference between the face-to-face and the two GDSS conditions. Post hoc Bonferroni tests showed no difference between the two latter conditions. These data conform partially to the expectations of Hypothesis 4.
Discussion
The results of this study are largely consistent with our thesis that GDSS-mediated communication has differen- Note. GDSS = group decision support systems.
a Significance of linear trend contrast, b Number of unshared minority arguments presented or repeated, adjusted for transcript length, c Number of positive and negative reactions to unshared minority arguments, adjusted for transcript length, a 5-point scale measuring extent to which group members attempted to pool their different information, e Higher numbers indicate change to higher quality decisions after discussion, maximum = 5. f Higher numbers indicate higher quality decisions, maximum = 6. tial effects on the expression and the influence of minority opinions. Minorities expressed their arguments most frequently and persistently when they communicated anonymously through GDSS. At the same time, minorities received the highest level of positive attention and had the greatest influence on the private opinions of members in the majority and on the final group decision when they communicated face-to-face. Our data, however, did not conform to the specific linear pattern that our pain-gain hypothesis predicted, based on the degree of social presence in our three communication conditions. We had expected the least influence of minority arguments in the GDSS anonymous condition, the greatest influence in the face-to-face condition, and intermediate influence in the identified GDSS condition. Instead, we found no difference in influence between the two GDSS conditions. Similarly, the expression data did not correspond precisely to our predictions. The anonymous GDSS condition did substantially increase the expression of minority arguments as we predicted, but the two identified conditions (i.e., identified GDSS and faceto-face) did not differ. Moreover, the face-to-face condition did not produce the lowest rates of minority opinion expression, as would have been expected by the linear predictions.
An implicit assumption in our hypotheses was that the three experimental conditions manipulated here differed from each other in social presence by equivalent degrees. It is thus tempting to take our finding of greatest influence in the face-to-face condition and no differences between the GDSS conditions as evidence that social presence was weak and approximately equal in the two GDSS conditions. A problem with this view however is that the data on argument expression were consistent with an interpretation that social presence indeed differed between the two GDSS conditions. The rate of minority argument expression in the anonymous GDSS condition was double the rate observed in the identified GDSS condition (M = 6.10 vs. M = 3.04). It is hard to argue therefore that participants in the two GDSS conditions felt equal degrees of social presence.
Rather, it would appear that variations in social presence were manifested in ways different than we had originally expected. Communication medium seemed to account for most of the differences in attention to and influence of minority opinions, as the largest differences in these measures were observed between the face-to-face condition and the two GDSS conditions. On the other hand, anonymity seemed to account for the differences in minority opinion expression, as the largest differences were between the anonymous GDSS and the two identified conditions (i.e., face-to-face and identified GDSS). In short, our original conceptualization of social presence, . reflected by the pain-gain hypothesis, may have been overly simplistic. One alternative to a simple social presence interpretation of our findings was suggested by certain data appearing in Tables 1 and 2 . This alternative, which we label the politeness norms explanation, is based on the idea that communication medium affected the type of public reactions to dissenting views that participants were willing to display. 3 Politeness norms generally prescribe that group members make positive responses to each other, refrain from blunt criticisms of each other, and appear to listen attentively to each other (cf. Hewes, 1986) , and such norms are likely to be more salient in the face-toface than in the GDSS conditions. Conformity to this politeness norm rather than respect for the minority's courage may therefore have explained the high positive reactions and low negative reactions to minority arguments seen in our face,to-face condition. The distinction between the politeness norms view and the simple paingain view is subtle. The pain-gain view suggests that in face-to-face settings, the influence of minority arguments would be related to the majority members' perceptions of the minorities themselves (i.e., as confident and sincere), whereas the politeness norms view suggests that the influence of minority arguments would be related to the majority members seeing other majority members reacting positively to the comments of the minority.
Certain aspects of our data did offer some support for the politeness norms view. To the extent that politeness norms were operating, we should have found that majority members' public reactions to minority arguments completely mediated the relationship between communication condition and the influence measures. A precondition to testing whether a variable can be a mediator is to establish that the proposed mediator correlates with the dependent variable(s) of interest (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . As Table  1 indicates, positive reactions to minority arguments significantly correlated both with majority private opinion change (r = .51) and group' decision quality (r = .41 ). A mediational explanation thus seemed possible with this variable. Negative reactions to the minority arguments, however, did not correlate with majority private decision change (r = -.07) or decision quality (r = -.05). It was thus inappropriate to examine this variable further as a possible mediator.
Proceeding with positive reactions, we used the procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) to examine the extent to which this variable mediated the relationship we observed between communication condition and our two measures of influence (i.e., group decision quality and majority private opinion change). To conclude that public positive reactions from majority members mediated the relationship between our experimental conditions and group decision quality, we examined whether (a) communication condition significantly predicted decision quality; (b) communication condition significantly predicted positive reactions; (c) positive reactions significantly predicted decision quality; and (d) when we controlled for positive reactions, the relationship between communication condition and decision quality was no longer significant. A similar set of steps was followed to examine the extent to which public positive majority reactions mediated the effect of our experimental conditions on the dependent variable, majority private opinion change.
The results of these analyses showed that (a) condition did predict decision quality (/3 = . . It thus appears that public positive reactions to minority arguments completely mediated the effects of communication condition on group decision quality.
Positive reactions did not completely mediate the relationship between communication condition and private majority opinion change, however. We found that (a) condition predicted majority private change (/~ = .51, p = .0004); (b) as above, condition predicted positive reactions (B = .33, p = .03); (c) positive reactions predicted private change (/3 = .50, p = .001); but (d) when we controlled for the effects of positive reactions, communication condition continued to account for a significant proportion of the variance in private opinion change (/~ = 0.39, p = .004).
The finding that positive reactions completely mediated the effect of communication condition on the group decision quality is consistent with a politeness norms view. That is, public statements of agreement with the minority arguments moved the public group decision toward the minority position. On the other hand, these public positive reactions from majority members only partially mediated the effect of communication condition on the majority members' private opinion change. Communication condition continued to have some direct effects on the majority members' private opinion change after controlling for the effects of majority members' positive reactions. This pattern is consistent with our original pain-gain view in that the influence of minority arguments was enhanced by face-to-face communication and diminished by anonymous GDSS communication, independent of public reactions to those arguments. This is not terribly surprising in that private opinions, being free of public scrutiny, should be less affected by social politeness conventions.
Although we have posed the pain-gain and the politeness norms views as alternatives, these two interpretations are not inconsistent with each other. Indeed they could complement each other. Face-to-face minorities may be viewed as more sincere and credible (as specified by the pain-gain view) while at the same time receiving a more courteous reception from majorities (as specified by the politeness norms view) than GDSS-mediated minorities. Both mechanisms could substantially amplify the impact of face-to-face minorities provided that they have the fortitude to mention their arguments. Group decision quality and majority member opinion change were significantly related also to the informationpooling variable. The extent to which group members recognized the~ differences in their information sets and attempted to reconcile those differences accounted for 30% of the variance in group decision quality and 22% of the variance in private decision change (see Table I ). Moreover the data in Table 2 indicate that face-to-face groups were much more likely to engage in this information pooling than were the GDSS groups. 4 The majority member reactions to minority arguments are related also to this difference in information pooling. Examination of the discussion transcripts suggests that the majority members in anonymous GDSS groups were suspicious of the minority information, and they tried to refute rather than to reconcile the minority arguments. These group members assumed that the minority information was either incompatible with their own or just plain wrong. This is consistent with the pain-gain argument that unseen and anonymous minorities were not perceived as credible. Face-to-face groups, on the other hand, were more likely to compare the information presented by the minority with that of the majority and to discover that the minority possessed information that was complete rather than inconsistent. Thus, the positive reactions of the majority in the face-to-face conditions again may reflect both belief in the minority member arguments and polite behavior. The two mechanisms together could have led face-to-face groups somehow to reconcile and integrate the minority views with the information possessed by the other members. This of course led to improved decision making in this condition.
These information-pooling results bear on past research on information sharing in group decision-making discussion (e.g., Gigone & Hastie, 1993; Stasser, 1992) , which has found that groups tend to discuss disproportionately more of the information the members hold in common than the information each member brings uniquely. One 'explanation for this predominance of shared over unshared information is probability sampling. That is, the 4 One possible explanation for this difference could be that face-to-face participants simply showed each other their papers. This did not occur, however, in any of the groups here. more people in a group there are who possess a particular piece of information, the higher the probability that there will be someone who recalls and mentions that information, all else being equal (Stasser et al., 1989) . If the uniquely held information is crucial to reaching a highquality decision (such as the minority information in the present study), group performance can suffer. A straightforward solution to this problem would seem to be to find a way to make the uniquely held information available to everyone. If only the group could hear about this important unshared information, they would "see the light" and thereby produce a higher quality decision. The results that we have reported here suggest that such a view may be too optimistic and that simple transmission of such facts is not sufficient.
Rather, the findings of this study suggest that if the presentation of key unshared informationis not accompanied by group attention and acceptance, this information may have little impact on group decision quality. Dennis (1996; in press) has presented data consistent with this suggestion. He also found that GDSS groups shared a larger percentage of the information necessary to reach a correct decision than did face-to-face groups but that the GDSS groups were no more likely to reach the correct decision. Thus, it seems likely that the decision errors associated with unequally distributed information may be surprisingly resistant to corrective information, particularly if the information is presented through a communication modality in which minority input can be easily discounted.
Our data suggest further that in addition to probability sampling, normative pressures also play a role in suppressing unshared information. Based on pure probability sampling, the ratio of unshared minority information to the shared information discussed in the groups here should have been equivalent across the experimental conditions because information distribution was held constant. Instead we found twice as much unshared minority information expressed in the anonymous condition, where normative processes are weakened (Baron et al., 1992; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) , than in the two identified conditions. This observation is important given that in the typical hidden-profile study group members enter discussion favoring the same alternative, which is likely to generate a group norm favoring that alternative. The current data suggest that these normative processes contribute to the low frequency of unshared information in group discussion, along with the probability processes emphasized in past information-sharing research (e.g., Stasser et al., 1989) . Loosening normative pressures through a mechanism such as anonymity may thus increase the expression of uniquely held information. Note, however, that our resuits have also shown that merely increasing the expression of such information will not guarantee it will have impact.
Although the findings reported here provide added insight about the effects of communication medium and anonymity on social influence and information sharing, an important caveat concerns external validity. The'smdy reported here was the first to examine the differential effects of minority opinion expression versus influence as a function of communication modality. We must thus be cautious in generalizing from these results until additional data are accumulated. For example, the participants in the current study were naive users of GDSS technology. We cannot rule out definitively that their inexperience accounted for the discounting of minority information. Perhaps participants with more experience with technology would better know how to incorporate the information of all group members. We must also consider whether our results would generalize to other types of tasks. Changing the nature of the group decision or the pattern of information distribution, for example, might result in different effects of communication modality. The degree of familiarity with the task or importance of the decision consequences to the participants may also affect our results here. Taking into account these cautions, the present resuits nevertheless offer several provocative outcomes that we believe will prove useful in guiding such future work.
On the whole, the results reported here highlight the fact that facilitating the expression of minority views will not necessarily result in minority influence. As such, these resuits directly challenge recent assertions that anonymous computer-linked communication systems such as GDSS will result specifically in both greater minority influence and improved group decision quality (Rao & Jarvenpaa, 1991 ) . More broadly, these results also challenge the belief, implicit in much writing on GDSS, that equalizing participation among group members will lead to better group decision making (e.g., Dennis & Gallupe, 1993; Dennis et al., 1988; DeSanctis, 1993; McLeod, 1992 McLeod, , 1996 . McLeod (1996) pointed out that a difficulty with this belief lies in the definition of participation that is assumed in GDSS research. Message sending has been taken to represent the whole of participation and communication; however, classic definitions of communication (e.g., McGuire, 1969; Shannon & Weaver, 1949) include message receiving, interpretation, and acceptance as well as sending. The GDSS technology itself enables the decoupling of message sending from message receiving, which is one of its putative benefits. Now that this literature has shown how GDSS can facilitate message sending, it is time to examine more systematically this technology's effects on message processing. This technology may reduce barriers to participation for all group members, but how to extract the benefits of this increased participation requires further study.
